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The physical damage incurred by the Solid Rocket Boosters during reentry on the initial Space 
Shuttle flight raised the question of whether the hardware, as designed, would yield the low cost per 
flight desired. An ad hoc committee of technical specialists was chartered to quantify the damage, 
determine its cause, and recDmmend specific desipn changes which would preclude recurrence. Flight 
data, post-flight analyses, and laboratory hardware examinations were used during the course of the 
investigation. The resultant fmdings pointed to two principal causes: (1) failure of the aft skirt thermal 
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during water impact. Design changes were recor ;mended on both the thermal curtain and the aft skirt 
structural members to prevent similar damage on future missions. 
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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 
SPACE SHUTTLE STS-1 SRB DAMAGE INVESTIGATION 
FINAL REPORT 
INTRODUCTION 
The successful launch and recovery of two Solid Rocket Boosters (SKB) troni the initial Space 
Shuttle (STS-1) mission provided an early opportunity to evaluate the reuse potential of SRB suh- 
system hardware. While the design of a SRB suhsysterii for the ascent portion of the mission is based 
on conventional (i.e., conservative) design criteria, the design philosophy for SKB reentry and water 
impact was, rather, to select the most cost-effective design option. This design philosophy entailed 
accepting varying degrees of risk, from mission-to-mission, that certain components may bc damaged, 
perhaps beyond repair, before the end of their useful life. This philoso,,i,y also allowed a ''shoot 
and see" attitude, where significant uncertainty existed, prior to the STS-1 launch. of the expected 
reentry environment or the capability of a given design approach to survive a predicted einiionment, 
and where the development cost for alternate dehign approaches would have heen substantially hlgher 
thnn the selected design. Consequently, the degree of tlaniage found on the recovered STS-I hardware 
was of great interest from the standpoints of cost effectiveness of the SRB design and the accuracy of 
the attrition model used to forecast cost per flight. 
Three areas of damage observed on the recovered boosters were identified as being substantially 
more severe than predicted. These were: (1) structural damage t o  the aft solid motor case and 
stiffening rings, (2) general heat damage to components mounted in the interior of the aft skirt, and 
(3) structural damage to the primary stiffening rings in the aft skirt. An ad hoc committee, compsed  
of engineers representing various disciplines within NASA Marshall Space Flight Center; United Space 
Boosters, Incorporated, the booster assembly contractor: and Thiokol Corporation, the SRM prinir 
contractor, was formed to investigate these areas of damage. The committee was chartered to accom- 
plish three specific objectives: 
1) Define the actual damage in specific technical terms. 
2) Reconstruct the failure scenaio based on flight data, postflight analyses. and laboratory 
tests. 
3) Recommend specific design changes, if any, which would be cost effective in later launches 
of SRB hardware. 
This report summarizes the evidence gathered and the findings an(! recommendations generated 
by the committee. Much additional detail is available in t lw various I t + t m  and reports generated 
during the course of the investigation. 
DAMAGE SUMMARY 
The general condition of the STS-1 SRB was well within prelaunch expectations followin# 
recovery. A complete external visual examination was performed immediately after the boosters were 
removed from the water [ I ] ,  and o huge number of still, cobr photographs, movie footage, and video 
tapcs w m  uwd to document the general appeurnce of the basic structure and subsystem hardware. 
The initial inspection revealed thne g a d  ucu where damage was s@ifb.nt ly  greater than 
expected. I t  was most apparent that the intarior of the aft skirts on each SRB had been exposed to 
Further, the stiffening rings in the interior structure of the aft skirt were d a m & ;  in particular, the 
intermediate rhq of the three stiffening rings was scvmcly damaged on both recovered boosters. 
Finally, the aft motor case segments were found to  have sisnificant damage to the bolt-on stiffening 
rings, and one segment on the left-hand booster (A07) had a visible flattened area (“oil can**) in the 
cascwa& 
her- resulting in thermal damage to  TVC subsystem components and electrical wiring. 
Followin# the formation of the ad hoc committee, these damaged uear were carefully 
inrpected md the damage was defined in detail down to the component kveL In the paragraphs 
below, the mulb of the detail inspections are summuued * for each of the three areas hvcstigatcd. 
The subsystem hardware within the aft skirt, consisting of the thrust vector control (TVc) 
hardware, electricpl cables, arid instrumentation sensors (ami their associated wiring), were inspected 
in detail in both the left-hand (A07) booster and the right-hand (A08) booster f o l l o w  the return 
of the hardware to MSFC. In general, the coinponents in A08 incurred substantially more frre damage 
than did those in A07. 
1. Cable Ihmage. A general inspection of electrical CabliIlg was paformed before removal 
[2,3], and a series of photographs were taken to record the damage. Figure 1 shows one such photo 
graph taken of the A08 cabling prior tc, removal. In general, all cabling below the fomudmost rinS 
showed some thmnid damage, while cables muted above this were undamaged. Both A07 and 
A08 booster cabling suffered substiintial thermal damre with those in A08 being the more severely 
damalwd. 
a. A07 Cables. Cables below the in te rmdate  stiffening ria were the more severely 
damaged, with moderate damage up to the upper ring, and little or no damage to those cables above 
the upper h g .  Although some cables were parted, none were h u m 4  in two, but appeared to have 
been m w h a n i d y  broken, perhaps by aerodynamic buffeting. The breaks occurred at various loca- 
tions, some just behind the connectors. All of the water-tight jackets on reusable caMes showed 
evidence of leakage with corrosion at the interfaces with the w a t e r - w t  connectora 
. b. A08 Cables. Cables in the right-hand booster suffered substantially more damage than 
those in the left-hand booster, although the damwe was of the same type as Seen on A07. The 
presence of a heavy coating of smoke residue on all interior surfaces made visual determination of 
fire damage d i f f i t .  
2. TVC Damage. There was a substantial difference in TVC damage between the LH (A07) 
booster p d  the RH (A081 booster (41. The ow1 auxilipty power units and hydraulic power aupplies 
(“tilt*’ and “rock”) of A07 sustained mostly m C ‘ i c  damage, whereas the comparable A08 hardware 
was much m9re severely damaged. The greater A08 damage appeared to  be the result of being 
exposed to eithcr higher heating or a fire within the aft skirt cavity. 
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The A07 hydrazine and hydraulic oil contaLning elements were still sealed, and no loss of 
fluids had occurred. Both the left (rock) and right (tilt) components were judged, from external 
examination, to be worthy of refurbishment. Some minor water impact damage was noted and this 
is shown in Table 1. In contrast, both the hydrazine and hydraulic oil containing elements in  A08 
were open, with all hydrazine and most of the hydraulic oil lost. The hydrazine elements suffered 
severe damage, while the hydraulic element component damage was generally limited to tubing and 
flex lines. Table 2 gives a summary of damage received by individual components within the TVC 
subsystem, and Figure 2 shows a general view of the A08 TVC subsystem. 
TABLE 1. A07 TVC SUBSYSTEM DAMAGE 
Item 
A. Rock (left side) 
1. Fuel Isolation Valve 
2. Fuel Supply Module InsulaLion 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
Fuel Supply Module, Impact Shield 
Fuel Isolation Valve Inlet/Outlet Hoses 
Fuel Supply Module and Reservoir 
Connectors 
B. Tilt (right side) 
Fuel Supply Module Impact Shield 1. 
TABLE 2. A08 TVC SUBSYSTEM DAMAGE 
I tem 
A. Rock (left si,'e) 
1. 
2. 
3, 
4. 
5 .  
6. APU Fuel Pump 
7. Fuel Valve 
8. Filter to Fuel Supply Module 
9. Fuel Supply Module Overflow 
10. Water Impact Deflector Brackets 
11. Reservoir Outlet Line 
Low-?ressure Relief Valve (3/8 Dia) 
Low-Pmsure Crossover Line (l- l /2 Dia) 
Hydrazine Fill Line (1/4 Dia) 
Fuel Feedline Hose (1/2 Dia) 
APU Purge in and out Flex Lines 
B. Tilt (right side) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. Feed Flex Lines 
5 .  APU Fuel Pump 
6. Fuel Valve 
7. Actuator Crossaver Return 
8. Fuel Isolation Valve 
Low-Pressure Relief Line (3/8 Dia) 
Filter to Fuel Supply Module 
Fuel Supply Module Fill Line (1 /4 Dia! 
Condition 
Shock mount ring separated 
Lower two-thirds missing 
Bracket broken 
Kinked 
Heat Damage 
Bracket broken 
Condition 
Ruptured 
-, inctured 
Pu!led from Boss 
Pulled from APU 
Ruptured 
Ruptured 
Damaged 
Ruptured 
Ruptured 
Broken 
Flattened 
Ruptured 
Ruptured 
Pulled from Boss 
Separated from APU 
Disintegrated 
Damaged 
Impacted 
Ruptured 
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B. Aft Skirt Structural Damage 
Figures 3 and 4 chart the specific damags received by A07 and A08 aft skirts, respectkely. 
his damage is further described below. 
1. a. The most obvious and perhaps the most significant SRB damage was sustain& by 
the structural rings on the interior of the aft skirt. Damage was generally similar in both skirts, and 
this damage may be characterized as follows: 
a. Forward Ring. Local damage to the inboard aft side of the flange 0:' tke ring. 
b. Intermediate Ring. Severe damage to nearly al l  of the ring except t:nt F rtion 
immediately behind the TVC subsystem. 
c. Aft Ring. Extensive cracking in the outer flange at  the ring web. 
Figures 5 d 6 show views of the damage sustained by the intermediate ring. In all instances, tire 
dam* incurred by tne rings appeared to be the result of a forward acting, longitudinal force; Le., 
al l  damaged structure which was still attached was deformed in a forward direction. In addition, the 
fractures appeared to be very brittle' with little apparent yielding or  plastic deformation evident. 
Other damage nokd w;?~.  (1) A07 actuators impacted the inboard flange of the intermediate 
rings causing partial shearing of tht  inboard ring flange, and (2) one longitudinal skin stiffener on A07 
between the intermediate and forward rings was cleanly sheared off at the skin line, apparently the 
result of a SecondaT impact by a large piece of intermediate Ang web which was missing in the same 
area. A number of ring-reinforcing gussets were rompletely mising from the intermedia'. ring in areas 
where the ring web was also missing. Some gusset fasteners w e n  neatly sheared off at thc interface 
between the gusset and the skin stringer to which they were attached. Perhaps, the most mystifying 
structural damage noted was a through crack, approximately 15 in. long, on the inner flange of the 
aft ring. 
2. Thermal C u r a n .  As expected and per design intent, the thermal curtain was destroyed 
at the completion of the mission. The only remaining pieces of the themal curtain were the 
shredded ends of the curtain segments under both the n.ft skirt and nozzle compliance ring retaineis 
(Fig. 7). Also observed in the aft skirt area was that two t:-.armal ctrtain retainers on the nozzle 
compliance ring were missing on each SRB and that these were missing prior to the reentry mudgill, 
of the aft skirt interior. These two retainers were immediately adjacent to the initiLcion pOkt of tile 
nozzle linear shaped charge. Figure 8 shows a view of the A08 nozzle compliance r i k ~  8,1d shows the 
obvious discoloration of the paint due to reentry smoke. One other thermal curtain retainer segment 
was missing on tke A07 compliance ring, located approximateiy 90 degrees counterclockwise from the 
nozzle initiation point (as viewed looking forward). The surface under retcuncr segment, however, 
was c lan ,  indicating the segment was lost after reentry smudging - presumably at water impact. 
1. L3ter microscopic examination of the fractures showed the failures to  be ductile while metallurgical 
maIysis of the material ir. static tensile tests showed limited ductility (1 to 4 percent) in the short 
transverse direction. 
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TABLE 3. SRB MEASUREMENTS LOST DURING REENTRY 
M I D  
BO8 D8092A 
B98D812!A 
L3ot(D8 I ?2A 
B5bP8300A 
BOSP8303A 
R08P8305A 
B08P83 14A 
B08P8330A 
B08P8332A 
BO7 plt 3 50A 
P07P835 1 A 
BO 7383 5 'A 
BO 7P83 5 3A 
B07P8359A 
B07P8360A 
B07PY36 1 A 
BO 7P8 3 62 A 
B07R8W 1 A 
B07R8402A 
BO 7R8403 A 
B07R8404A 
B07R8405A 
BO 7 R840 7A 
B07RS408A 
B07R8409A 
B07R8434A 
B07R8435.4 
B0'7R8436A 
BO? R8449A 
B07T8474A 
B07T8475A 
B37T84 76A 
B07T8477A 
B07T8478A 
B581'8507A 
B58T8508A 
B07T8509A 
B07T85 1 OA 
B07T85 1 1 A 
BO7T85 12A 
B07T85 2 7A 
B46T8 5 34A 
346T8535A 
B08Y8982A 
Description 
Vib -- Aft Sepn Motor, Radial Dir. 
Vib - Input to TVC Lower Frame, Rad Dir 
Vib - Input to TVC Lower Frame, Flt Dir 
Press - Diff. Tilt Servo Actr. 
Press 
Press 
Press - Engine Nozzle, Ext. 2 
Press - Aft Skirt, Ext. 1 
Press - Aft Skirt, Ext. 3 
Press - Ascent, Ext. to Heat Shield 1 
Press - Ascent, Ext. to Heat Shield 2 
Press - Ascent, Ext. to Heat Shield 3 
Press Ascent, Ext. t o  Heat Shield 4 
Press Ascent, Int. to Heat Shield I 
Press Ascent, Int. to Heat Shield 2 
Press Ascent, Int. t c  Heat Shield 3 
Press - Ascent, Int. to Heat Shield 4 
Heat Flux - Radiation, Aft Skirt 1 
Heat Flux - Radiation, Aft Skirt 2 
Heat Flux - Radiation, Aft Skirt 3 
Heat Flux - Radiation, Aft Skirt 4 
Heat Flux - Radiation, Aft Skirt 5 
Heat Flux - Total, Aft Skirt I 
Heat Flux - Total, Aft Skirt 2 
Heat Flux - Total, Aft Skirt 3 
Heat Flux - Total. Aft Skirt 4 
Heat Flux Total, Aft Skirt 5 
Heat Flux -- Total, Aft Skirt 6 
Heat Flux - Total, Int. Aft Skirt 1 
Temp - Aft Skirt, Mid Top Outboard 
Temp - Aft Skirt, Mid Top Inboard 
Temp - Aft Skirt, Mid Bottom Inboard 
Temp - Aft Skirt, Mid Inboard 
Temp - Aft Skirt, Aft Inboard 
Temp - Hydraulic Fluid, Syst. A 
Temp - Hydrauiic Fluid, Syst. B 
Temp - Aft Skirt, Int. Top 
Temp - Aft Skirt, Int. Inboard 
Temp - Aft Skirt, Int. Bottom 
Temp - Aft Skirt, Int. Outboard 
Temp - Cable Raceway, Fwd 
Temp - APU A Turbine Exhaust 
Temp - APU B Turbine Exhaust 
Ext. Static, Fwd Skirt 2 
Ext. Static, Fwd Skirt 4 
ACOU. - Aft Skirt, Ext. NO. 1 
Lost 
330 Sec 
350 Sec 
340 Sec 
340 Sec 
340 sec 
340 Sec 
340 Sec 
340 Sec 
340 Sec 
338 Sec 
335 Sec 
335 Sec 
335 Sec 
330 Sec 
330 Sec 
330 S r .  
335 Sec 
310 Sec 
340 Sec 
340 Sec 
340 Sec 
340 Sec 
343 Sec 
342 Sec 
336 Sec 
333 Sec 
340 Sec 
330 Sec 
338 Sec 
340 Sec 
330 Sec 
334 Sec 
330 Sec 
330 Sec 
340 Sec 
340 Sec 
330 Sec 
330 Sec 
330 Sec 
330 Sec 
330 Sec 
330 Sec 
330 Sec 
335 Sec 
Note 
Notes: (1) Comparable measures failed on other SRB. 
(2) No comparable measure on other SRS. 
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TABLE 3. (Concluded) 
MSID 
BWY8984A 
B08Y8985A 
B08Y8986A 
007R7449A 
B07R7450A 
B07T7470A 
B07T747 1 A 
BOTr7473A 
BO7T7509A 
BO7T75 10A 
B07T751 1A 
B46T7534A 
Description 
~ ~ ~ _ _ _  ~ ~~ 
Acou. - Aft Skirt Heat Shld. Int. No. I 
Acou. Aft Skirt Heat Shld, Int. No. 2 
Acou. - Aft Skirt Shld, Int. 
Heat Flc:- Total, Int. Aft Skirt I 
Heat Flux - Total, Int. Aft Skirt 2 
Temp. - Aft Skirt, Fwd Bot Inboard 1 
Temp. - Aft Skirt, Fwd Bot Inboard I 
I'emp. - Aft Skirt, Fwd Bot Inboard 2 
Temp. - Aft Skirt, Int. Top 
Temp. - Aft Skirt, Int. Inboard 
Temp. - Aft skirt, Int. Bottom 
Temp. - APU A Turbine Exlraust 
Lost 
~~~ 
331 Sec 
332 Sec 
334 sec 
338 Sec 
340 Sec 
347 sec 
347 sec 
395 sec 
350 Sec 
332 Sec 
337 Sec 
330 Sec 
Note 
Notes: (1 ) Comparable measures failed on other SRB. 
(2) No comparable measures on other SRS. 
on the STS-1 boosters and failed during the early stags of atmospheric reentry. This section sum- 
marizes the status of data as determined by the STS-I Flight Evaluation Working Group and docu- 
mented in the Final Flight Evaluation Report [71. 
A. Significant Event Times 
Table 4 gives a summary of STSl times for significant events as extracted from the STSl  
Final Flight Evaluation Report. 
B. Reentry Thermal Data 
Reentry heating within the aft skirt cavity was of s:Aal interest, and a limited amount of 
valuble data was obtained prior to sensor malfunctions [SI.  
1. Calorimeters. SRB reentry aerodynamic heating for STS-1 was measured by ascent 
calorimeters only, since reentry DFI calorimeters will not be installed until STS3. The ascent 
calorimeters were not sized for reentry, nor werc they located appropriately for determining reentry 
heating. However, valuable insight into the performance of the SRB thermal curtain was obtained by 
comparing calorimeter data from a sensor exposed directly to the externai heat flux (facing aft) to a 
Sensor within the aft skirt cavity (i.e.. bebind the thermal curtain). Figure 10 shows the former, for 
the RH SRB and Figures 11 and 12 shcw the latter for the LH and RH SRB, respectively. It is 
apparent that the thermal curtain was dble to provide excellent thermal insulation prior to 200 sec, 
but afforded little or no protection 1:pon encov.lrrtering reentry aerodynamic heating at approximately 
300 sec. 
TABLE 4. RB SIGNIFICANT EVENT TIMES 
I ten1 
1 .  
7 -. 
3 .  
1. 
>. 
0. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
1 1 .  
Event Description 
Liftoff 
SRB Scpardtion 
LH Nozzle Jettison 
RH Nozzle Jettison 
Reentry Max q 
LH High Altitude Baroswitch Closed 
(LH Nose Cap Jet tison) 
RH High Altitudt. Baroswitch Closed 
(RH Nose Cap Jettison) 
LH Low Altitude Baroswitcli Closcd 
(LI1 Frustum Separation) 
KH Low Altitude Baroswitch Closed 
(RH Frustum Separation) 
LH SRB Impact 
RH SRB Impact 
20 
15 
10 
Source 
SRM Thrust 
BS7P7311A 
B52X7847E 
B5 2 X889 7 E 
Estimated 
85ZX7880E 
BS 2XX880E 
BS5 V 1 h 18A 
0 5 5 V 2 6 1 8 ~  
B52X7886E 
BS 2X8886E 
Time from Ref (sec) 
Actual 
1.183 
131.826 
202.875 
203.016 
341.0 
369.004 
371.343 
391.49 1 
393.793 
424.9 1 5 
428.052 
Erdic  ted 
1.205 
! 7 i .103 
A)'.> 
202.5 
334.0 
360.2 
- -  
3hO.O 
382.0 
382.0 
426.0 
426.0 
100 200 300 
TIME (seconds relative to 1981:102:12: 0: 3: 0 )  
Figure 10. Aft skirt heating rate (A08). 
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Figure 1 1 .  Internal aft skirt heating rats (A07). 
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Figure 12. Internal aft skirt heating rate (A08). 
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OF POOR QUALiTY 
? Thermocouples. The SRB aft skirt striicturai temperatures were recorded bv total of 
17 thermocouples mounted on the interior of the aft skirts. Table 5 summarizes the locations for 
both the LH and RH boosters. The response of thermocouples located on the aft skirt skins is shown 
i n  Figures 1.3 and 14. In addition, the STS-1 preflight nominal temperature prediction Ius been 
plottea lor one thermocouple which is designated by the darkened symbd (A) on each !ig.iib. Also 
shown IS &. scond coniparison curvc with the predicted temperature at  the same locatinrl if  lie 
thcrnial i.i.rrtain were lost prior to  thc niaxiniuni reentry heating. 
tor tht- aft ring frames i n  the LtI and KI1 SKB, respectively. 
b'igurc's 15 and 10 S I ~ O H '  siwilar tlata 
W i t h  two exceptions. :dl thermocouple data were lost hetivccii 320 and 315 scc (tlic tho sui- 
viving thermocouples are. however, still suspect after 350 sec). The loss of data is believed to  be 
caused by the progressive physical damage of DFl cables as described earlier in this report. 
TABLE 5 .  SI 5. ! AFT SKIRT STRUCTURAL TEMPERATURE MEASUKI:MtlNTS 
Measuremcnt No. 
1.13 SK B 
B07T7470A 
B07T7473A 
~07 ' r747  I A 
B07T75OOA 
B07T75 1 OA 
B07T75 1 I A 
B07T75 13A 
RHSRB 
B077'8474A 
BO'lT8475 A 
BO7T8476A 
B07T8477A 
B07T85 12A 
B07T8 W9A 
B07T85 10A 
B07T85 1 1 A 
B07T8478A 
XB 
1x77 
I877 
1877 
1926 
1926 
1 S"h 
1926 
1910 
187: 
1910 
1310 
1927 
1926 
1926 
1526 
1926 
0 
90 
135 
1 Oh 
358 
90 
1x7 
2 70 
45 
31s 
2 2 5  
265 
273 
358 
90 
180 
2 70 
Description 
Skin 
3k i n  
Sklil 
Al't Ring Frdine Web 
Aft Ring Framc Web 
Ai't Ring Frarne Web 
,4il King Franie Web 
Skin 
Skin 
Skin 
Skin 
Skin* 
Aft Ring Frame Web 
Aft Ring Frame "v'c'n 
Aft Ring Frame Web 
Aft Ring Frame Web 
Number 
1 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
7 
1 
2 
3 
4 
NI'A 
1 
3 
.4 
1 - 
*Beneath instrument island. 
3. skirt Passive Temperature Sensors. Passive temperature seiisors were applied to the aft 
interior structure prior to the STSl  launch. Ihese stick-on sensors were applied to record the maxi- 
mum local structural temperatuies during the mission Table 6 shows the maximum temperatures 
recorded by the sensors for various locations; however, the data is suspect, and is judged to be not 
indicative of the actual structural temperatures. There was ample ~ ~ i r f e n c e  shoving the sensors to be 
responding to gas temperature following the failure of the thermal curtain. 
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TABLE 6. DAi'A FROM PASSIVE TEMPEMTURE SENSORS 
Parameter 
0 Loss Due to B.wnout 
0 Primary Loss Zone 
a Maximum Temperature Recorded 
-skin 
- Ring Frame Web 
- Stiffener Flange 
- Stiffener Web 
Aft skirt 
A07 I A08 
30% 
XB = 1910 Aft 
e = 450 to 3150 
3 1 0 " ~  (e = 3150) 
2 9 0 " ~  (e = 0") 
290°F (e = 0") 
2 9 0 " ~  (e = 00) 
50% 
Xg = 1877 Aft 
e = oo to 1350 
3900~ (e = 135") 
395°F (e = 135") 
375°F (e = 225", 315") 
400°F (e = 225") 
0 Passive temperature sensors responding to gas temperature. 
- Not indicative of structural temperature. 
4. SRM Instrumentation. Instrumentation on the SRA nozzle was of interest in assessing 
the presence of SRM afterburning during reentry. Two sensors (B07R8410A and Bo7841 1A) on the 
RH SRB nozzle near the exit plane show total heat flux to havz tailed off from an average of 3.0 
Btu/ft' sec in the 130 to 135 sec time frame to approximately 0 Btu/ftz sec at 167 sec and remained 
there until nozzle severance, at  which time the instrumentation is disabled [9J. 
5 .  Reentry Film. Color, 70 mm movies were taken of SRB reentry from the tracking ship 
USNS Vandenberg with long telephoto lenses. A 120-in. camera was trained on A07 between 361 sec 
after liftoff and water impact, ana a 180-in. cinetelescope camera recorded the A08 reentry between 
247 sec and water impact with only two short (4 to 5 sec) lapses. The SRB reentry f h s  were of 
interest thermally in that they clearly showed the burning in the aft skir! cavity during a portion of 
the atmospheric entry. The color of the flames, the color of the smoke, and the time the fire was 
observed ucie all valuable evidence in determining the cause of the fLr .  A bright orange fire and 
thick black smoke were visible in the reentry films beginning near the time of nose cap jettison, 368 
iec after lift-off, at about 16,000 ft altitude. The smoke and flame were substantially gone by the 
time of frustum separation at 393 sec (6,000 ft altitude). 
C. Water Impact Loads Data 
As noted previously, much instrumentation was lost during the early reentry phase. This was 
particularly true for those sensors dealing with water impact loads. Some limited data of a gross 
nature was obtained and this is described in the following. 
1. Accelerometers. Both axial and lateral accelerations were obtained for both boosters. 
From visual interpretation of oscillographs, the events at water impact can be generally reconstn-ted 
as foliows: The mavimum axial loads occurred during the initial impact phase with maximum accel- 
erations for both A07 and A08 of 14 to 16 g. Maximum lateral loads, in the order of 8 to 10 g, 
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occurred at both initial impact and cavity collapse. In addition, the lateral accelerations give some 
indications as to the direction of  loading: approximately in the -Y direction 5 r  A07 and midway 
between the -Y and -2 axes for AO8. 
2. Pressure Transducers. Pressure transducers to measure water impact prcssures in the aft 
skirt were located only in the RH (A08) booster. None of these measurements survived the early 
aerodynamic reentry phase (Table 31, so no local pressure data was obtained. 
3. SRM Instrumentation. Pressure t r a d u c e r s  were located on the aft SRM segments at SRB 
stations 1637 and 1765 (Le., on the SRM case wall between the stiffener stub flanges). These cir- 
cumferential arrays of pressure transducers provided good data for defrning direction and magnitude of 
cavity collapse loads on the motor case. Figure 17 shows this data along with a reconstructed cavity 
collapse pressure profie for the RH booster (Am). 
Another valuable SRM measurement was t,k internal motor case pressure dwing water impact. 
Figures 18 and 19 give the time history of the motor case internal “ullage’* pressure, and show the 
significant pressure drop at water impact in both boosters This pressure drop is caused by the rapid 
cooling of the internal gasses by water spray through the nozzle. This pressure drop, 10 psi below 
ambient for A07 and 7 psi below ambient for A08, adds directly to the cavity collapse pressure load- 
ing on the case exterior. The measurements are also of interest as an indicator of the internal ullage 
gas temperature at water impact. 
4. Reentry Films. The reentry films, described earlier under Reentry Thermal Oata, were 
also quite useful for water impact analysis. Approximate preimpact orientation of both boosters, 
both in angle relative to the velocity vector and the clocking angle, were determined from frameby- 
frame analyses of the fims. 
POST FLIGHT ANALYSES 
A number of postflight analytical studies and hardware failure analyses were performed to  
specifically identify the causes of the damage observed on STS-I boosten. In general, these analyses: 
(1) showed that hypothesized events either could or could not have happened, (2) reconstructed actual 
flight events based on available data, or (3) predicted future flight events based on S T S l  experience. 
Some of the more significant postflight analysis results are given below. 
A. Thermal Analyses 
Thermal analyses were performed for the portions of the SRB aft skirt area to determine what 
sequence of events occurred that could have produced the f i e  related damage on STS-I. 
1 .  Reentry Ignition Potential. Thiokol analysts evaluated the potential for SRM unburned 
propellants to ignite (“afterburning”) upon reentry i ito the atmosphere [91. In addition, the SRM 
internal insulation, liner, and n o a l e  ablatives were assessed as potentid hydrocarbon fuels during 
reentry. The restilts of these analyses, as stated in Xeference 9, show that SRM propellant afterburn- 
ing did not occur, but either the nozzle ablatives or insulation and liner were a likely source of burn- 
ing during reentry. TabL 7 gives the composition of nozzle pyrolysis gas and Table 8 shows the 
inflammability limits of certain gasses. The Thiokol analysis also shows that ignition of the pyrolysis 
gasses should occur in the chamber prior to about 316 sec after lift-off. 
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Figure !8. SRM internal picssure (A07). 
Figure 19. SRM internal pressure (A08). 
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TABLE 7. NOZZLE PYROLYSIS GAS COMPOSITION 
Spccie 
Carbon dioxitle 
Mass Mole 
Formuia Fraction Fraction 
coz 0.327 1 0.240 
Isopropyl alcohol 
Met hint 
Carbon Moiloxide 
Acct ylcne 
0.2044 
0.1635 
0.261 7 
0.0025 
0.1 10 
0.329 
0.302 
0.003 1 
TABLE 8. INFLAMMABILITY LIMITS WITH AIR 
(Atmospheric Pressure and Koom Temperature) 
Specie 
~~~ ~~ 
Methane 
Ethane 
Propane 
Is0 butane 
Pentane 
Ethylene 
Acetylene 
Cyclohexane 
Isopropyl Alcoliol 
Fonnuia 
Limits of Inflammability 
(Volume Percent) 
Lower 
5.3 
3 .O 
7 3  
e.- 
1.8 
I .5 
3. I 
2.5 
1.3 
2.0 
15.0 
12.5 
9.5 
8.4 
7.8 
32 0 
80.0 
8.0 
12.0 
2. Aft Skirt Components Temperatures. A reentry thermal analysis was performed assuming 
no thermal curtain between the SRM nozzle and the aft skirt aft ring [IO]. Since the actual reentry 
orientation of the A07 and A08 boosters L w l d  not be determined, the predicted aerodynamic heating 
rates for these analyses were based on an assumed vehicle tumble profile. Four subsystem 
elements which suffered extensive damage on STS-1 were examined: (1)  the TVC low pressure relief 
hydraulic line, (2) the hydrazone service line, (3b a shielded, waterproofed measurement cable, and 
(4) a shielded, nonwaterproof measurement a b l e  routed to the actuator. Analytical results showed 
that the TVC low-prcusure relief hydraulic line (titanium) had a predicted maximum temperature of 
570"F, and tlic Iiydr;i/ine service line (stdiiilcsa steel) up to 440°F. The predic?ed temperatures could 
cause rupture of the lines (the relief line was ruptured on A08, no lines werc ruptured on A07). 
Maximum predicted Icinperatures of the clcctrici~l cables ranged between 545°F and 74C°F which is 
sufficient to produce the damage observed on A07 and A08 cables. 
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3. Nozzle Severance LSC Temperature. A thermal analysis was performe; by Thiokol 1 1  I I 
to determine the temperature rise in the nozzle linear shaped charge if nozzle severance were delayed 
until just prior to water impact, Le., the nozzle LSC would be subjected to reentry acroriynani?: 
heating. The analysis indicated that there would be no thermal degradation nor autoignition I w u ~ d  
created by the additional heating, and, in fact, the predicted temperature rise at the Lsc' would ot' 
only 3°F. However, it was concluded that adlitional insulation would be required for protcctiori 0. 
the initiator lead wire. 
Parameter 
Vertical Velocity - V v  
Horizontal Velocity -- VH 
Impact Angle - B 
Roll Angle - qj 
B. Structure Analyses 
Left SRB (A07) Right SRB (A08) 
93 fps 94 fps 
<5 fps -3 fps 
- 3 O  to -7O -3" to - 7 O  
See Figure 21 
The aft skirt structure, in particular the three stiffener rings, was extensively analyzed to 
determine the intensity of the applied water pressure during splashdown which would be required to  
produce the damage seen on the STS-1 boosters. This loading was compared to the preflight pre- 
dictions based on STSl  initial water impact conditions as determined from scale model drop tests. 
1. Water Impact Conditions. From analysis of films, the initial velocities and altitudes of 
both A07 and A08 boosters were estimated [7] .  These conditions are shown in Table 9, with thc 
coordinate and sign coventions illustrated in Figure 20. The water entry vertical velocity was deter- 
mined to be significantly hgher than the 88 ftlsec value predicted for STS-I boosters as well as the 
85 ft/sec design value. The horizontal velocity was estimated to  be very small in comparison with the 
dcsip value of 45 ft/sec and the impact angle was estimated to be approximately that used for dcsign 
loads, i.e., 6 = -5 degrees. 
The roll angle or clocking angle orientation, as shown in Figure 21, showed the horizontal 
vclccity vector to  be in the -Y direction for A07 and approximately midway between the -2 and 
dictions, with a maximum initial depth of approximately SO f t  on both boosters compared to tlie 
design value of 40 ft. Both bbosters stabilized in the spar buoy flotation mode, as predicted, with 
evcritual freeboard during initial retrieval operations of 25 ft on A07 and 40 f t  on A08. 
-I' axes for A08. Penetration depth of the boosters was significantly greater than preflight pre- 
2. Cavity Collapse Loads. The analysis of cavity collapse differential pressures on STSl 
boosters involved determination of both internal and external pressures during water impact. Using 
the pressure data from the eight pressure transducers at the two aft SRM stations described earlier in 
this report, a peak cavity collapse pressure of approximately 167 psig was determined at vehicle 
station 1765. Figure 22 shows the good comparison of the measured value with the peak pressure 
predicted for the STS-I a c t d  conditions. The analysis did show that the axial distribution of pres- 
wrc was slightly more forward on thc vehicle than predicted as shown ir, Figure 23. 
SURFACE 
V v  - VERTKAL VELOClTY 
VH - HORIZOUTAL VELOClfv 
e - PITCH ANGLE 
4 - ROLL ANGLE (ANOLE BETHTEEN 
m m N T  Of  VH IN SRB Y-z 
PUWE AND +Z AX1s. MEASURED 
CLOCKWISE FROM THE +Z AXIS 
LOOKING FORWARD.) 
h - PENETRATION DEPTH 
NOTE: ALL VALUES POSKIVE AS SHOWN 
A07 (LEF Tl 
Figwe 21 
VIEW LOWfdO FORWACSD 
SRB roll orient3tions at water impact. 
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VERTICAL IMPACT VEL 
WATER ENTRY 
ANGLES (deg) 
Figure 2 2 .  Cavity collapse peak pressure. 
VEHICLE STATION (h.) 
Figiirc 73. Cavity collapse presrure -~ longitudinal distribution (A08), 
Tht. internal SRM caw pressures wcrs analyLet1 from on-hoard measurements [ 121. As illus- 
tr.!tccl in 1,'igurt.s 18 and 19. thcre was a significant prcssurc drop in both cases: 
,t,lihiciit on A07 and 7 psi h d o w  atiihicnt OD AOX. This prcssurc drop is grater  than thc 1.5  11, 2 . 0  
17' I prcciictcd a\ design criteria. 
10 psi below 
3 .  Aft Skirt King Strcsscc. A key question in the aft skirt investigation was what causcd 
tlic structure failure ot  tlic ring frames. The STS-I water impact conditions weie somewhat diftcrcnt 
tlian prci'icted. so it WJS necessary to define a new set of applied loads on the aft skirt structure. 
Ii4ng thc parametric water impact loath data derived from scale model drops, a revised set of loads, 
I n e d  on actual drop conditions, was defined and applied to the aft skirt structure. TIIC resulting 
; I ,  c s w ,  wcre tlien computed to deteriiiioe whether the damage observed on the aft skirts was ! k d y  
t o  Ii,ivr happened at thc specific STS-I water entry conditions. The recults of the analyses, given In 
'I.!hlc 10 show that thc ring damage should not have occurred at the skecific STS-I water entry con- 
tiiirons. The analyses used representative ring material properties hased on postflight tests ot spcG 
nii'ns cut from the failed rings. 
31 
TABLE 10. RESULTS OF POST-FLIGHT STRESS ANALYSIS 
ON THE AFT SKIRT INTERMEDIATE RING 
Condition 
I 
VH (ftlsec) 
45 
10 
~~~ ~~ 
S T S  1 Confiuration 
o Design Conditions 
(Model Test Loads) 
Web Factor of Safety 
eo (Psi) 160°F 250°F 
Pressure 
-5 157 1.27 1.16 
-5 83 1.93 1.77 o STS-1 Actual Impact 
Conditions 
(Model Ta t  Loads) 
L d  
VV (ftlsec) 
85 
92 
4. Aft Skirt Ring Capability. Since the loads predicted from model test data were not 
sufficient to cause the damage observed on the aft skirt rings, additional analyses were performed to 
define the failure modes of each ring. With skin pressures held constant and ring web pressures 
allowed to increase until failure occurs, the mitial and sometimes secondary failure points were detrr- 
mined. The results of these analyses for the stiffening Mgs is given in Table 11. It can be seen that 
the analyses accurately predict the failure modes observed on STS-I, but the web pressure required to 
initiate failure is substantially greater than prefhght predictions. 
TABLE 11 AFT SKIRT RING CAPABILITY AT FAILURE PRESSURE 
Failure Pressure* (psi) 
Upper Ring Inner Flange Failure 
Ring Loads Only 
Ring and Skin Loads 
Aft Ring Failure 
Initial Failure of lower 
Outboard Flange 
Second Failure Would be Shear 
of Fasteners Between Gusset and 
Skin Stiffener 
390 
335 
280 
400450 
~ ~- ~~~~ ~ 
*Factor of Safety = 1.0 
5 .  Attrition Predictions. Ail analysis was performed [ 13 J to define new attrition prcdic- 
tions based on STSl  observations, i.e., early failure of the aft skirt thermal curtain and increased 
water impact loads on the aft skirt rings and the actuator attachment structure. The revised attri- 
tion estimates are compared to the preflight predictions in Table l?. for the actual STS-1 impact 
conditions. In general, the analyses show tha; an early failure of the theimal curtain has much less 
effect on attrition thur does the estimated increase in water impact loads. In either m e ,  Lire attri- 
tion rates are much higher than acceptable levels except for the actuator attachment structurc. 
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TABLE 12. SRB ATTRITION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
---- 
Heat Shi4d Ir;!xt at Water Impact 
Aft R i 1% 
lntcrniediate Ring 
f;orward Ring 
Cascading (Actuator Attach System) 
k a t  SliielJ Failed Near 290 scc of Flight 
Aft Ring 
1r:ternwdia t e Ring 
Forwml Ring 
Cascading (Actuator Attach System) 
Mtritions (5) 
(Databook Loads,' 
Fit. New Loads) 
Yearly Nominal 
3 1.2lhO.h 
449187.8 
0.3148.4 
6.12 
42.6107.4 
5 5.6/92.8 
0.7162.7 
b. 72 I 
Note: 1 .  The attritions shown reprcscnt ultiwate conditions. 
2. The numbers separated bb a / are tlie attritions using the 
load data book reference compared to the load shown in 
Memorandum EP43(8 1-30), 
C. Hardware Examinations 
Post flight laboratory cxamination of SRB hardware was undertaken in several instances to 
help pinpoint the nature o f  observed anomal+ and to define the spccific damage incurrcd whcre t h i b  
could not bc determined visually. 
1 .  
examined [ i 4 ]  for traces of aluminum (SRM propellant) and magnesium and silicon (SRM asbestos 
liner). No traces of alumirurn oxide were found in the soot o r  contamination on painted surfaves. 
Significant quantities of magnesium and silicon were detected on all samples collected. While these 
could be indicative of asbestos, the ratio of magnesium to silicone was not relatively constant nor 
suggestive of asbestos. It was concluded that the source of the magnesium and silicon were niore 
likely to have resulted from random dirt or seawater exposure. 
Soot Composition. The black soot prevalent on the interior surfaces of the aft skirt was 
2 .  TVC Coniponent Fractures. %e failed A08 TVC hydrazine system components. con- 
sisting of overflow, purge, bypass, and feedlines, were examined visually and by fractographic and 
metallographic analyses [ I5 1. From the visual and low power magnification examinations, extraneous 
molten teflon was discovered on the stainless steel tubing, and molten teflon was present o n  flex 
hoses. The line failures were all concluded to  be caused by internal pressure which produced a ductile 
overload rupture. Microstructure and microhiudness evaluations of the metallic components werc both 
acc2ptable. 
3. Aft Skirt Ring Material Properties. Tensile test specimens were taken from both the aft -- 
and intermedi, te rings on thc A07 aft skirt [ 16,171, The resulting data is given i n  Tables 13 and 14 
for the aft ring and intermediate ring, respectively. In general, thc properties were found to be above 
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TABLE 13. TENSILE TES’I RESULTS SRB A07 AFT SKIRT LOWEK KING SEGMENT 
Specimen 
Number 
L- 1 
L-2 
L3 
L-4 
s- 1 
S-2  
S-3 
S-3 
QQ-A-XO/~O (*r) I 
UTS 
(ksi) 
62,830 
65,470 
67,420 
68,990 
64,020 
63,3 20 
63,800 
60,l 10 
5 7,000 
TY S 
(ksi) 
49,390 
51,170 
52,800 
543 10 
5 1,330 
49,800 
50,850 
51,170 
42,000 
‘% e l, 1 / 2  in.) 
1. L = Longitudinal; S = Short Transverse; T = Long Transverse. 
2. (M-A-250/30 = Long transverse only at i /4 plate thickness. 
TABLE 14. TENSILE TEST RESULTS FROM STS-I AFT SKIRT INTERMEDIATE RINGS 
Specimen 
N uinbrr 
A07 L- 1 
L-2 
L-3 
LT- 1 
LT-2 
L1-3 
ST- I 
ST-2 
ST-3 
A08 L- 1 
L-2 
L-3 
LT- I 
LT-2 
ST- 1 
ST-2 
ST-3 
QQ.4-250/30 Req. 
UTS 
(ksi) 
65,600 
63,860 
63,08u 
64,580 
64,330 
6 1,260 
59,770 
57,610 
5Y,710 
64,O 10 
63,870 
63,640 
65,530 
63,700 
55,930 
5 6,200 
56,040 
6 1,000 
--- 
TYS 
(ksi) 
5 2,460 
52,780 
5 1,569 
52,600 
52,570 
50,460 
52,77C 
52,670 
52,770 
53,180 
52,750 
52,330 
53,160 
52,820 
52,350 
52,470 
52,640 
49,000 
% Elong. 
in I in. (4D) 
10 
10 
10 
6 
4 
6 
4 
3 
2 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
2 
1 
1 
3 
NOTE.: 1 .  QQA-150/30 kequirements are for LT direction a t  
I /4 in. plate thickness. 
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[lie niiiiiiiium syecificatim allowable for boih the longitudinal and long transverse directions. 
intermediate ring, however, the s h i  rt transverse properties were feud to be below t? '  QQ-A-250/31 
specification minimum ultimate t t v  d e  strength values (stated for long transverse direction only). 
Fo- t h e  
4. Failure Analyses of Rings. Visual, spectrogrdphic, rad wgraphic, metallographic, and f rx -  
tographic analyses were perfornied on portions of the fractured ring segments for both tlic aft dnd 
intermediate rings of the A07 SRB [ 16,171. 
a. Aft R' J. Failure analyses showed the failed segment to  have sustained a ductile 
tractiire with the fracture originating on the aft face of the web at its juncture with tlie outboard 
(skin) tlange. The aluminum alloy material was within the acceptable h i t s  of the purchasing speci- 
fication, and there w:1s no evidence of any unusual segregation of constituents or unusual grairi Iitc. 
Some corrosion, attribt ted to seawater exposure, was evident. 
b. Intermediate Ring. The ' itermediatc ring was detcrinined to havt sustained two 
~Iuctile fractures of the outboard (skin) flanges. The two fractures were near a n i  para'ld *3 the : inp  
web and progressed in opposite directiom (Fig. 24). As with the aft ring, thc dlumir . i ~ r l  . . .  ~ > y  
material exhibited no unusual segregation of constituents or unusual grain size. Spec:rc . s y V i j i C  
:tnalyses of the ring were conducted on material from both near the center and near II . :  s,tr ... 'e, and 
Ihe ring materid was within the aluminum associatioa chemical composition !imits fer 2- . ' I  .87 
3 1 urn inid rn alloy . 
5 .  Failure Anaiysis of Nozzle Actuator Brackets. As descrihed earlier in this report, actuator 
hrackets on the nozzle end of both A07 actuatow hiled during water impact loading. The failure 
analyses of these brackets [ 18; concluded that tlie brackets failed in a ductile man- ,r as a restilt o . 
:I tensile overload. The fracture surface characte:iftics were found to be indicatib: of high v.-iocily 
impact loads. The fracture modes of both brackets were determincd to Ipe essentially mirror images 
of each othcr with tracturcs initiating - t  the "se of one of the pair ~ 7 ;  :onk !Iidinal lugs duect:y 
helow the large holes acconiinodating tile actuator att:chment pins. 
to be the result of actuator twsio'1 loads, i.e., lsads pulling away from the rlozzle, wit!i the fraitqres 
initiating OH the left sidr. of the left lug of the left-hand bracket and the right 1.idt: of t'lc right lug 
of the right-hand bracket at their juncture with the flanges bolted to the compliance ring. hlcchanical 
properties of the brackets. tlerivcd from tensile specimens taken frow tlie failed brackets, indicated a 
c.onsidcrable variation. Strengt!; of the 707s-T73 forged riiatrrial WP, significantly greater near the 
clu~*ncheJ surfaces and decreased near the center of tlie torging by zs tnuch as 15 ksi in ultimate 
tensilc strength. This was tmt considcrcd uiiusual for forgings of tliis geoinetry (6 to 7 in. tluck), 
but W.IS significant in that the failures initiated ;,ear the minitnuni strength portion of the brackets. 
!n summary, the faiJures appeared 
0. Postflight Dimensional Clieck. Because of the rtlatively severe damage on the aft \k i r t \ ,  
,I coinprelicnsive serics of  optical iiieasiirement~ were takcti on critical dimensions. These post!liplit 
nicasurcmcnts were tlieii coniprcd to recorded preflight valucs, wlicre available, or to sllow~thlc L! raw - 
itig tolcrances where prdliglit valucs were not recorded. The mcarqrements taken are sliown i n  Fig- 
ures 1'5, IO. and ??, and the results are given in Tables 15 dnd 10, In genera!, i t  was found that 
some dimensional changes had resulted from thc water impact load$, but that these changes wcrc siii;rll 
and would not prevent reuse of the skirts aft,r replacement of the damaged ring segments. 
AFT SKIRT SKIN 
Figure 24. Aft skirt intermediate ring fracture directions (A07). 
INTERMEDIATE RING 
AFT RING 
+-- 
Figure 25. Aft skirt ring measurements. 
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-KICK RING 
L4 
HOLDDOWN k 
Figure 26. Aft skirt post and kick ring measurements. 
Figure 27. Aft skirt actuator bracket measurements. 
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TABLE IS. STS-1 AFT SKIRT POSTFLIGHT DIMENSIONAL CHECK RESULTS 
Aft Ring Diameter' 
Intermediate King Diameter' 
Upper King Diameter' 
Upper to Intermediate Ring Spacing3 
Intermediate to Aft Ring Spacing3 
Bottom Plane of Aft Skirt 
Top Plane of Aft Ski. t 
Aft Skirt Diameter '41 i'olddown Posts 
A07 (in.) A08 (in. ) 
-0.009 to M.039 -0.074 to -0 .24J 
-0.0 14 to -0.048 , -0.0 1 1 to -0.040 
-0.052 to M.0 I 1 
-0.022 to M.003 
-0.008 to 4-0.035 Targets Lost 
-0.038 to M.007 
to.009 to +o.oox 
Actuator Bracket Location 
Axial 
Radial 
Kick Ring Diameter 
Kick Kllig Clevis Holes 
~ ~ 
Toleranc I A0 7 
kO.0 10 
kO.0 10 
kO.0 10 
20.060 
20.443 
kO.0 10 
4.0005 
M.0025 
In Plane 
In Tolerance 
In Tolerince 
In Tolerxnce 
In Tolerance 
Out of Tolerance 
-0.020 to 0.026 
In To!erancr 
A08 
In Plane 
In Tolerrtiicr 
Out of 'Tolerance 
4.032 &i -0.100 in. 
Oct of Tolerance 
M.025 & W.047 in  
In Tolerance 
Out of Tolerince 
-0.008 to -0.023 
In Tolerince 
TABLE 16. S T S l  AM'  SKIRT POSTFLIGHT VERSUS PREFLIGIIT D1MENS:ONAL COhlPARISON 
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FINDINGS 
The ad hoc committee generated a number of findings using the data, inspections, aiulyses. 
and examinations which have been described earlier in this report. I n  generzl. these findings dcsribe 
the most probable series of events leading t o  the damage incurred on the STS-1 hardware. Tht.\e 
findings are given below with a brief discussion summarizing the pertinent evidence in support of 
each finding. 
A. Finding 1 
Failure of the SRB thermal curtain was precipitated, prior to reentry, by the initiation of the 
linear shaped charge (LSC) employed to jettison the SRY nouk .*  
Discussion. Thermal performance of the thermal curtain war. nominal through the entire awcnt 
heating regime ( i x ,  until after SRM burnout at 167 sec), but was almost totally lacking upon thc 
carliest encounter with reentry aerodynamic heating. Two thermal curtain ret.iiners at each SRM 
compliance ring interface were forceably detached prior to reentry smudging of the aft skirt interior 
wrfaces [19]. The nozzle LSC is quite close to the thermal curtain retainers (Fig. .!X), and prohlms 
with containing the blast without thermal curtain damage were experienced during static qualification 
firings of the SRM. The temperature rise recorded in the aft skirt cavity agrees quite well with 
preflight analyses for an assumed total loss of the thermal curtain at reentry [8]. 
Figure 28. Nozzle LSC in relation to thermal curtain retainers. 
3. Results of the STS-2 flight. where the nozzle LSC initiation was delayed until after parachute 
deployment, indicate that the thermal curtain will fail from atxodynamic phenomena (e.p., t lut  tcr) 
alone. Notwithstanding this, tlic cvidcncc. from STS- 1 is conclusive that tlicrmal curtain dainagc 
resulted from thc carly nonlc  L X  initiation. 
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Finding 2 
Aerodynamic heating was the principle c a w  of rupture ot tlir TIT tuel system on A08 and 
tlic cable damag:, )n both boosters. 
Discussion. A postt4ght analysih of selected components which had suffered thermal damage 
showrd that the temperatures necessary to cause the observed damage could be attained from aero- 
dynamic Iieating alone 1201. ?’he reentry burning, as secn on the movie covemge, is typical of that 
seen on ground static tirings prior to (0, quenching, in4 generates only 3 to 5.5 Btu/ti- sec [Sl ,  
much less than the 1 1  Btu/ft2 sec rceiitry aerodynamic heating. 
AOY TVC fuel lines indicates internal rupture of the tubing and ignition ot tlic Iiydrarinc atter 
rupture. Although not conclusive. it 15 likely that the greater therinal damage obwwed uii A08 is 
tlir result of hydrazine combustion attcr rupture of the furl lines. 
Labomtory examinatioii 01’ the f i ld  
C. Finding 3 
The SRM “afterburning” observcd on both boosters during reentry was caused by burning of 
pyrolytic gasses from nozzle ablatives ignited by molten slag (Al2O3). 
Discussion. The smoke color observed on the reentry filnis is black, which indicates burning 
of hydrocarbons rather than SKh,l solid propellant [ 141. In addition. the smoke and fire are Seen 
only after entry into the sensible atmosphere (about 16,000 ft) where the required oxygen is avail- 
dble to support combustion. SKM instrumentation recorded nozzle exit planc Iit8ating tiirough nozzle 
jzttison at 203 sec, and calorimeters wcnt to Lero at about 167 sec. A laboratory analysis of soot 
deposits on the aft skirt interior showed no traces of aluminuni which would be present if SkM 
propeihnt were the fire’s source. A Tliiokol post-fight analysis showed that the ignitioii tcmperature 
requird for pyrolytic gasses must be a minimum of 1470°F to 2080°F and die predicted siag 
(Al,U,) temperature would be 3200°F at  the observed igrution time (368 sec) [UI .  
D. Finding4 
(’dtity collapse loads were aggruvatcd sliplitly by a reduced intrrnal SKM pressure at  splash- 
do w I? resu 1 ring from higher-t hac-prcd i c‘t ed i nt crna 1 case t cm pcrat urcs. 
Discussion. ‘Thc internal prrssuic of thc SKM case during cavity collapse loading I\ largely 
dc.pe:i&bnt on the internal gas temperature ininiediately prior to water impact. A prctliplit analysis 
by Tliiokol. wluch predicted a chamber gas teinprriture of 124”F, did not include effects ot IJurniiig 
ot p> !olytic gases diiring reentry. An .iPJatcd. postflight :!iiaI~sis was pcrforincd by ‘1 h w h d  
using worst case assumptions of complcte cornbustioii of both nozzle and chaniber ott-gases lor the 
longest possible time ( 1 10 sec). This aiialysis showed the maximum internd temperature to be 
1756°F. An MSFC analysis, based on the pressure collapse data of Figures 24 and 25, showed tile 
ullage g3s tcmyciaiures to be 830°F tor A07 and 500°F fbr A08 [ 17 1 .  
1 I J 
kitema1 cavity collapse loads cxpcriencd on SI’S-1 boowrs  agrcc well with prcttligiit pie- 
dictions with the exception of the location of the peak prc-uic. 
Discussion. From the limited data available from instrumentation on the SRM case, peak 
cavity collapse pressures agree well with the magnitude predicted by the scale model drop tests. There 
was some adjustment in longitudinal distribution indicated, in that the “leading edge” of the pressure 
peak was about 5 ft forward of the predicted location. The damage incurred on the SRM case and 
stiffening rings can be attributed to the forward location of the peak cavity collapse pressure, the 
actual STS-1 impact conditions (which were near those giving maximum cavity collapse loads), and 
the higher-than-predicted negative pressure inside the motor. 
F. Finding 6 
Water impact loads on the S T S l  aft skirt stiffening rings were substantially higher than pre- 
flight predictions. 
Discussion. Although the water impact conditions, specifically the vertical velocity of the 
boosters, was outside the design envelope, preflight design load tables (211 encompassed the actual 
parameters experienced by the STS-1 boosters. Post-flight stress analyses showed that, at the actual 
impact, conditions seen by both A07 and A08, the structural loading predicted by the loads tables 
would not cause structural failure. Laboratory tests of tensile specimens tahen from the failed A07 
rings (16, 171 showed the basic material properties to be within specification allowables except for 
the short transverse direction which was not specified. Since it was determined that the short trans- 
verse direction was the failure direction in some instances, the minimum test value was used in sub- 
sequent analyses. A review of the geometry of the drop model used in gegerating design loads 
showed the model stiffening rings did not represent the actual flight rings ir. that their (radial) depth 
%as less and there was no inboard flange. Also, the rings were not instrumented on the drop test 
model to obtain ring w:b pressures, so loads provided for ring stress analyses used measured skin 
pressures in the vicinity of the rings. 
G. Finding 7 
The A07 actuator brackets acted as a weak link, or “fuse,” and prevented damage to other 
SRB components. 
Discussion. Preflight attrition andysis [ 221 concluded that failure of the actuator attachmed 
structural components would cause cascading failure of other aft skirt/nozzlemoun?ed components. 
It was also determined to be cost effective for these structural components to fail fmt,  thus protect- 
ing the actuators from damage [23].  This effect was demonstrated on STS-1 (A07). Cascading 
damage did occur to two intermediate ring segments (and possibly an aft ring segment) and the aft 
exit cone shell from the bracket failures on A07. However, the actuators were undamaged and Fnssed 
acceptance test requirements in postflight tests. Damage to the nozzle exit cone resulting from the 
bracket failures is reparable, as judged by Thiokol, but at a cost approaching 80 percent of new exit 
cone [24]. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings described in the previous section, the ad hcc committee formulated a 
number of recommendations leading to resolution of the problems encountered on the STS-I flight. 
These recommendations deal princiQally with keeping the thermd curtain intact through the aero- 
dynamic heating regime, if possible, and with redefining the water impact loads on the aft skirt 
stiffening rings. 
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A. Kecotnmendation 1 
Delay SRM nozzle severance until after the main parachutes arc deployed. 
Discussion. Since the principal cause of early thermal curtain loss has been detertilined to  be 
damage incurred at initiation of the nozzle LSC near apogee on STS1, the delay of nozzle severance 
until main parachutes are deployed would effectively remove the source of the damage. Stuciit.5 per- 
formed early in the SRB design stages had showed the late LSC initiation tune to be feasible: Irow- 
ever, reentry acoustics were thought to  be hbher thm acceptable based on initial wind tunnel tests. 
Later wind tunnel tests llave now shown tlie acoustic levels to  be within acceptable limits. Aiiotlicr 
study performed as part of the ad hoc committee's activities shows that SRB reentry aerodynamic 
stability characteristics are generally more favorable, but that higher drogue parachute loads csn r w i l t  
if the nozde extension remains on during 'eentry. Higher internal SKM cliamber gd. tenipcrswrcs 
are also possible because of an increase in exposed surface area of nozzle ablatives [ 1 1 J and s larger 
"air scoop" to  feed oxygen to  any burning of pyrolysis gases. In the abovc cases, however, the risk 
of drogue parachute overload or sinkage of the SRB, respectively, have been carefully sxaiiiiiied and 
found to be acceptable. Recontact of the SRB aft skirt with the nozzle extension in the watcr hiis 
also been studied and found to pose no undue risk. 
B. Recommendation 2 
Increase the strength of fitsteners at the retainers for tlic t1icrin:il (.iii:~iin at tlie SKV ntvli.: 
compliance ring. 
Discussion. The two retainers immediately adjacent to the initiation point of the SRM nozzle 
LSC were detached on each of the STS-I boosters. Evidence is conclusive tli:it the rct:iiticr tartcmrs 
failed as a result of a tensile load induced by products of the LSC initiation blast I 1 Y j .  
tion ha shown that the current 1/4-in-dianieter fasteners can be changed to 51 I b-in.-di;irnetrr ~ i t l i o i ~ t  
impact to the design. This would provide nearly 60 percent increase in tcnsile strength and still 
perniit increasing the fastener size to 3/8-in.-diameter if rework became neccwry. 
IIivtsLga- 
C. Kzc~;inrnentlation -3 
Improve development flight instrumentation to define watcr iii1p;i i . t  l ~ . ) r i ( l ~ .  oil af t  A i r t  . I  i t  !c,i-!i:! 
ring,. 
-- Discussion. Only a limited number (4) of pressure transducers were a~;ail:ible to pi ovicl: it .!ICY 
impact pressure data on STS-I boosters, and these were ~*olttina.l to one boc)\tc~ [ 7 ] .  
of damage to  the structure obviously dictates that the design loads be rccictiiicJ. 1:irst priority \vouli! 
dppear to be adding active pressure transducers to all the ring webs. Yerliaps aii wceptaid.. .ilit'I n . i t i ~ t  
would be the addition of many passive pressure sensors, in the form 01' bui.31 d i w .  h i i i c l i  uoiild 
define, within limits, the peak pressures experienced throughout the al't skirt cwit]. i'rccautim., 
should be taken to ensure that active pressure sensors return data; i.c., th(.!iu 1 1  p io tcc i io i i  01  tlic x-li 
sors and censor wiring should be addcd in tlie evc*nt liigli Iicating i b  >tit1 ~ ' I I ,  1 '  f ~ ~ l t * t ~ . ~ !  ~ i i  l':iij.:i. I I I ~ "  
l i i \  5 t ! l i b  
* *  
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D. Recommendation 4 
Perform additional SRB model drop tests to define aft skirt water impact pressures at design 
condition extremes. 
Discussion. Design loads must be redefined to permit effective modification, or redesign. of 
the existing ring structures to preclude continued incidence of severe damage. While DFI, on early 
STS flight hardware, can provide valuable data on actual pressures encountered during water impact, 
it is unlikely that extremes of required design conditions will be seen during DDT&E flights. In 
particular, high horizontal velocities caused by wind conditions in the impact zone are unlikely because 
of DDT&E wind restrictions imposed a t  the launch site. Model drop data will provide the necessary 
data and can be correlated to  similar conditions experienced on the full scale boosters. 
E. Reconimendation 5 
Modify the design of the aft skirt stiffening rings to prccludc high incidence of ring damage 
;it water impact, 
Discussion. Attrition analyses performed in hght of the STS-I damage indicate that aft skirt 
ring damage is highly likely on all future flights unless the ring structures are modified. Design 
studies and stress analyses have identified a number of structural modifications which will significantly 
improve the load-carrying capability of the rings. These proposed modifications include adding addi- 
tional reinforcing gussets forward of all rings, adding brackets on the aft surface of the rings to 
support the inboard ring flange, adding an additional row of fasteners through the outboard (skin) 
flange of the rings, removing the aft skirt skin that projects aft of the aft ring flange, and adding 
hrackets between the aft surface of  the aft ring web and the aft outboard skin flange. In future ring 
buys, flange and web thicknesses could be increased. 
F. Rccomrnendation 6 
Determine design mechanical properties in the short transverse direction for the plate stock 
from which the aft skirt stiffening rings are fabricated. 
Discussion. The procurement specification for the thick plates used to fabricate aft skirt ring 
segments does not require minimum niechanical properties if: the short transverse direction. Tensile 
test specimens made from STS-I ring segments show the mechanical properties in  the short transvcrse 
direction can be significantly lower than the longitudinal or long transverse properties [ 16;. Stress 
analyses of the rings and observation of STS-I ring fractures show that somc critical failure modcs 
originate in the short transverse direction. Enough tensile tests nced to be performed to establish a 
statistical data base for defining the minimum design values for thc rings. 
G. Recommendation 7 
Evaluate the cost effectiveness of increasing the strength capability of the nozzle actuator 
bracket assembly at the SRM nozzle interface while retaining thc wcak-link concept (fuse) demon- 
strated on STS-I. 
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Discussion. The failure of tlic A07 actuator brxkets on SrS-1 appears to have prevented more 
serious (i.e., more costly) failures of the actuators and the structure adjacent to either end of the 
actuators. The successful postfhght acceptance tests of the actuator arid the reparable condition of 
such major structural members as the nozzle compliance ring a d  nozzle shell indicate the actuator 
brackets perform effectively as a “fuse” when excessive nozzle loads are encountered. However, an 
increased capability of the brackets could lessen the frequency of bracket failure and still relain the 
desired feature of protecting the actuators [ ? ? I .  
H. Recommendation 8 
Evaluate the need for adding stiffening rings to the stubs OR the SKM forward stiffcncr case 
segment. 
Discussion. Cavity collapse loading on STS-1 was determined to peak about 5 ft further 
forward than predicted by model drop tests. Coupled with the greater pressure drop now predicted 
in the SRM chamber at splashdown, the differential pressure in the aft SKM segments will be greater 
than that used for design. The forward stiffener case sgemen: on the A07 booster (s/n 019) sustained 
damage primarily because of the forward shift of the peak water prmure. The cavity collapse load- 
ing experienced on STS-I boosters was near the maximum value ever to be expzcted in future flights. 
Since the preliminary assessment of the recovered segments indicates the forward stiffener segment 
can be reused, it may not be cost effective to add the two stit’feners. 
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